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FACTORS INHIBITING- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
ON ROTIAN OLMAKONGO GROUP RANCH 
BY 
DEBORAH DOHERTY 
A B S T R A C T . 
This paper examines socio-economic constraints to the development 
of a group ranch in Narok District, Rotian Olmakongo, which has been in 
existence for .more than ten years but its progress relative to other 
Maasai ranches has been poor. The study considers questions regarding -
the members' perceptions of the costs and benefits of ranch development, 
access to the ranch resources, and individual and group strategies for 
development. 
The paper concludes that among the principal constraints 
is the inability of traditional social units to generate an organizational 
form which would promote the development of the group ranch. The pastoral 
economy is in a procfcrious position and is being aubsidieed by members 
participation other economic activities such as charcoal burning, 
cultivation and off-ranch employment. Unless the organisation of the 
ranch can be improved such that the livestock - based economy becomes 
more productive the only future for the ranch is likely to be in terms 
of small-scale agricultural holdings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The majority of .investigations dealing with the development 
of group ranches in Kenya's Maasailand stress the role played by 
ecological factors in enhancing or inhibiting ranch development (e.g., 
Pratt and G-wynne 197?) while, in some cases, efforts are made to illustrate 
how ecological conditions combine with socio-economic circumstances to 
effectively influence group ranching development (e.g., Campbell and 
Migot—Adholla 1979$ Davis 1971; Halderman 1972; Halderman 1972; Halderman 
1972; Hedlund 1971; and Jacobs 1973). Nevertheless, in spite of the 
importance socio-economic conditions have for the success or failure of 
development schemes in general, and group ranching in particular, little 
systematic research has been carried out on this subject. The present 
paper attempts to overcome this deficiency by offering an indepth 
socio-economic analysis of one specific Maasai group ranch situated in 
Narok District. This ranch is .some ting ox a special case since it has 
been incorporated for more than ten years but, its members have shown 
little development initiative; nor has the ranch .made by significant 
progress when compared to some ranches in Maasailand. 
In order to account for this singular lack of development, 
I intend to concentrate on how ranch .members perceive the costs and 
benefits of ranch development, how access to group ranch resources 
is structured,.and how individual and group strategies are used to pursue 
various ends and diverse interests. By doing this, I hope to demonstrate, 
that Maasai social structure can act as a major constraint on certain 
types of development and, at the same time, suggest ways in which this 
can be avoided, • 
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Rotian Olmakongo Group Ranch 
The ranch referred to throughout this paper is officially 
known as Rotian Olmakongo group ranch and is located so.me 16 km. north 
of the town of Narok. Rotian Olmakongo is bounded on the west by Rotian 
Kotikash group ranch, both of which share frontage on the Narok - Nakuru 
road. To the south, Rotian Olmakongo shares a common boundary with 
Olopito group ranch and a fenced individual ranch. The eastern boundary 
of Rotian Clmakongo is the Seyabei River which provides a natural 
division between R'otian Olmakongo and Olkeri and Murua group ranches. 
Directly to the north, Rotian Olmalcongo shares a common boundary with 
Oloorageek group ranch (see .map in Pig.l below which has been abstracted 
from the Rotian Olmakongo Development Plan, 1974, Ministry of Agriculture). 
Rotian Olmakongo group ranch is 1,661 hectares- in area. An 
ecological survey of this ranch carried out in 1974 shows that vegetation 
comprises 141 hectares (8.5%) of open forest with 57 hectares (40%) 
usable; 182 hectares (ll%) of bushed grassland of which 127 hectares 
(70%) is usable; 498 hectares (29.5%) of grassland with 100% of it 
usable; and, 847 hectares (51%) of forest of which 127 hectares (l5%) are 
usable. The total accessable area for herding activities on this ranch 
is 809 hectares (49%). The ranch is considered to be located on semi-
high potential land (see map in Pig. 2 below), 
A Brief History of Rotian Olmakongo1 
Rotian Olmakongo group ranch was officially demarcated in 1966. 
The process of demarcation in this area was considered to be uncomplicated 
compared to other parts of Maasailand, mainly because of the recognized, 
permanent, and lengthy association of certain families in the area with 
1. This history has been reconstructed .mainly through interviews 
with Maasai elders and will be supplemented later with archival research. 
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Rotian Kotikash 
- 4 - IDS/WP 356. 
definite land rights. For example, Rotian Olmakongo was demarcated on 
the basis of the Ole Masikonde family's lengthy period of residency in the 
area. In fact, it is worthwhile including a brief discussion of the 
major events leading up to, and comprising, their residency in order 
to better comprehend the demarcation process. 
Nkapilil ole Masikonde, the grandfather of many Nyangusi elders 
presently living at Rotian O'lmakongo group ranch, v/as one of the Maasai 
elders who signed the 1904 Maasai Agreement. Later on, Nkapilil became the 
senior elder of the Northern Maasai Reserve, although he was commonly 
regarded as a chief by the colonial officials at Rumuruti where he resided 
and worked as an interpreter for the British administration. 
Nkapilil and Legalishu, the other Northern Reserve chief, both 
opposed the subsequent 1911 Maasai Treaty. Howevei', due to pressure 
exerted on them by the British, they eventually agreed to sign. In fact, 
there is evidence to suggest that, because they signed this treaty, 
Legalishu was promised all rights to the Lemek Valley and Nkapilil was 
given the Likia area (Leys 1973: 129). Elderly Maasai presently living 
at Rotian Olmakongo remember the 1911 move to Likia and assert that 
Nkapilil was paid to do this and was 'cheated by the Europeans1, mainly 
because Mr. Powys Cobb and another European had already been given the 
same land. As a result, Masikonde was soon forced to move on to the 
Rotian area and, since he was a chief and an 'ol kitok (or respected elder) 
.many Maasai families followed him. 
The Rotian area was unsettled at this time, although it was 
commonly recognized by the Maasai to belong to the il-Lamat section. 
Nevertheless, Nkapilil and his followers settled there and prospered and, 
at the end of World War 1, Nkapilil was given the Medal of the First Honour 
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for persuading Maasai to supply the British army with sheep and goats. 
Nkapilil strongly supported education for the Maasai and sent 
his two eldest sons, Matanda and Oimeru, to school, first at Kijabe and 
later to the Church of Scotland Mission school at Thogoto. Oimeru later 
became the first president of the Maasai Association formed in 1930 and 
was at various times a senior chief. 
1930 also ushered in the well-known '.Famine of the Hides' and 
in 1936 East Coast Fever struck the Rotian area devastating the Maasai 
herds. However, since Nkapilil had earlier employed numerous Kikuyu and 
Kipsigis as herders, he retained them to plant shambas and provide the 
Maasai with free food until the cattle herds were built up again. Since 
the 1920's Masikonde's have lived in permanent settlements in the Rotian 
area and, while there was transhumant movement into and out of this 
area, anybody who wanted to settle permanently at Rotian had to obtain 
permission from the Masikonde lineage. 
Once the Masikonde lineage moved to Rotian, they quickly set 
up procedures for grazing and trekking cattle. Throughout the dry season, 
herds were usually kept within the confines of what is presently the 
group ranch, although they did graze their cattle as far away as Likia 
in Upper Mau. In fact, all of Upper Mau was regarded by the il-Purko 
Maasai as a reserve in case of drought. 
During the wet season, herds were dispersed to the south towards 
llchangi-pusi and lloisuisui. However, at demarcation, only that area 
associated with Masikonde permanent settlements was included in the group 
ranch. In relation to their traditional herding pattern then, the group 
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ranch has lost a major portion of what was formerly high-potential, 
dry season grazeland, along with all of their earlier wet season 
grazeland (see .map in Pig. 3 below). 
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In order to illustrate the extent to which adjudication has 
affected cattle movements in this area, it is important to loolc closely 
at the relationships presently existing between Rotian Olmakongo and 
neighbouring group ranches. Relations between the Rotian Olmakongo and 
Rotian Kotikash group ranches are strained with neither allowing the other's 
cattle on to their land. There are several reasons given for this 
restriction. Members of the ole Masikonde lineage claim that, in 1922, 
Nkapilil and Oimeru ole Masikonde gave Olenchoi (the dominant lineage on 
Olopito group ranch) and Kotikash (the dominant lineage on Kotikash 
group ranch) permission to settle in the Rotian area and the three groups 
soon began to exchange women in marriage. Later on when ranches in this 
area were being demarcated, members of the Masikonde lineage claim that 
people from Rotian Kotikash paid bribes to the land surveyoi-s in return 
for 300 acres of land which should have been part of Rotian Olmakongo 
according to tradition. This led to considerable conflict between the 
two ranches and the cessation of cattle movements across the Narok-
Nalcuru road which is their common boundary. 
later1 on, when Rotian Kotikash had constructed their own dip, 
they refused to allow .members from Rotian Olmakongo to pay a fee in return 
for the use of this facility. Residents of Rotian Olmakongo do not 
accept the explanation that this is being clone to keep Rotian Kotikash 
cattle disease-free. Rather, they claim such action derives from pure 
.malice and that their cattle cannot withstand the long trek to the Narok County 
Council dip every week. 
In contrast, for example, relations.between Rotian Olmakongo 
and Olopito group ranch are good and members from either ranch always 
receive permission to trek cattle across each other's land. Now, while 
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most of Upper Mau is presently given up to agriculture, thereby seriously 
reducing Rotian Olmakongo's traditional dry season grazeland, ranch 
members still trek their cattle to Eorr-Enkitok near the Enabelbel trading 
centre at this time of yeaj;. They also move their cattle to Sonkoro in 
Upper Milili during this time and, to do so, receive permission to pass 
through Olchoro. It should be noted here that there is absolutely no 
exchange of grazing rights between group and individual ranches in this ar<?a. 
Throughout the wet season, ranch .members are fo3?ced to keep 
their cattle on the ranch because their traditional grazelands near Ilchang:L-pusi 
pusi have been demarcated and now comprise parts of other group ranches. 
The .membership of these ranches do not allow herders from outside to 
2 enter their grazelands. 
Because of Rotian Olmakongo's favourable location in part of 
a dry grazing area, the ranch is frequently plagued with illegal graziers. 
This usually happens because some members give permission to graze to stock 
friends and relatives, especially to mother's brother's families and 
sisters's husbands. This aside, other ranches who are experiencing 
drought conditions also move onto Rotian Olmakongo without permission. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that Maasai from Upper Mau, who have 
registered land rights there, also move cattle onto Rotian Olmakongo ranch 
because of increased agricultural encroachment in their own areas. Such 
a practice can have serious effects on Rotian Olmakongo. During the 1976 
drought, for example, members from Rotian Olmakongo did not move their 
stock off the ranch because water was plentiful there. However, many herders 
2. This is a general view oi cattle movement since herders can, 
and do, exploit relationships with affines, agnates, and others in order 
to gain access to grazeland. 
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whose own areas lacked water .moved their cattle onto the ranch also 
This resulted in overgrazing on the ranch, especially in those areas 
near the Seyabei River. 
Rotian Olmakongo ranch members usually deal with illegal 
graziers in three ways; (l) by levying traditional fines; (2) by using 
physical force; and, (3) by reporting the problem to the government. 
Unfortunately, none of these methods have proven to- be successful and the 
problem is further compounded by the fact that some members at Rotian 
Olmakongo accept bribes, commonly referred to as 'gifts', in return for 
allowing non-.me.mbers to graze their cattle 011 the ranch. 
To conclude this section, it is worth mentioning that I 
have completed a survey showing the number of livestock 011 the ranch owned 
by registered members. However, it is pointless to attempt to estimate 
the grazeland available per livestock unit since this would lead to a 
gross misrepresentation of conditions on the ranch given the large volume 
of cattle grazing there illegally. Suffice it to say then, that land 
demarcation in this area altered traditional movements of cattle and this, 
in turn, has intensified conflicts between lineages, clans, etc. 
The Sociology of Rotian Olmakongo 
By way of introduction, it should be useful to provide some 
brief statistical information regarding this x'anch. To date, the ranch 
has 80 members, including one childless woman whose spouse has died-and 
14 non-Maasai .members. Of this total membership, 56 are resident members 
on the ranch and 24 live elsewhere. While Rotian Olmakongo was demarcated 
on the basis of the Masikonde lineage's long-standing association with the 
area, representatives of other il-Purko Maasai lineages and clans (sometime 
referred to as sub-sections) do have .membership on the ranch. It is of 
interest to note that the ranch was originally named, and is still 
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popularly known as, the Rotian Masikonde group ranch. However, becausc 
this gave the impression that the ranch 'belonged' to the Masikonde 
lineage, the name was changed. The same is true of the adjacent Olopito 
group ranch which is popularly called Olenchoi after its dominant lineage, 
as well as for other ranches in the district. 
The Masikonde lineage belongs to the il-ukumai clan and 
comprises 30% of all il-ukumai clan members living on the ranch. The 
remainder of the ranch membership belongs to the il-makesen, il-aiser, 
il-tarosero, and il-molelian clans, together with some non-Maasai. 
Interesting^ enough, the Masikonde lineage in particular, and the 
il-ukumai clan in general, believe that tliey are the only legitimate 
3 
claimants to the ranch. Most of the ranch members not belonging to the 
il-ukumai clan came into the Rotian area during the late 1950's and 
early 1960's once they began to lose grazeland elsewhere, i_>articularly 
in Upper Mau. In addition, there are many Kikuyu and ICipsigis acceptees 
living on the ranch who have been adpoted by the Maasai and now use the 
Ole Masikonde name. These too, however, are regarded as having less than 
'proper' rights to the land, mainly because they have encouraged too many 
relatives to follow them. Further to this, whenever the Maasai on the 
ranch are asked the question: Are there too many people living here?, the 
response is usually positive. However, after additional questioning, 
it seems that .most il~ukuinai members who feel this way do so, not because 
of any awareness of the carrying capacity of the ranch land and its 
relationship to population growth and resources usage, but rather, simply 
because there are too many of the 'wrong kind' of people there. Pig.4 
3. The dominant clan on Olopito group ranch is il-aiser and on 
Rotian Kotikash group ranch it is il-makesen. In addition, unlike other 
parts of Maasailand (Jacobs 1971), il-Purko Maasai of both Upper and Lower 
Kau associate 'elatia', or neighbourhoods, with lineage and./or clan 
groupings. 
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below shows the Rotian Olmakongo ranch .membership according to clan 
affiliation. 
Clan 
il-ukuma i 
il-makesen 
non-Maasai 
il-aiser 
il-tarosero 
il-molelian 
Total 
Mo. of Members 
41 
15 
14 
4 
1 
Percentage 
51% 
18 
17 
6 
5 
1 
80 
Pig. 4 
Prom the information in this table, it would seem that il-
ukumai clansmen could easily form an effective voting bloc if they were 
determined to wield their influence during ranch meetings. In fact, 
there is additional support for suspecting this to be the case when 
consideration is given to he composition of the ranch committee according 
to clan and age-set affiliation (see Fig,- 5 bclcsw) 
Committee Position 
Chairman 
Vice-chairman 
Treasurer 
Secretary 
Organizer 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Clan Affiliation 
il-ukumai 
il-tarosero 
il-ukumai 
il-ukuma i 
il-Makesen 
il-ukumai 
il-ukuma i 
il-ukumai 
il-ukuma i 
Age-Set 
Nyangus i 
Nyang\.isi 
Terekeiyia 
Rampau 
Terekeiyia 
Nyangus i. 
Nyangus i 
Nyangus i 
Nyangusi 
Fig. 5 
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Nevertheless, in spite of an overwhelming statistical majority, il-ukumai 
clansmen do not exert comparable influence on ranch decision;making, 
There are several reasons for this. First, a survey of the residential 
status of ranch members shows that 24 (30%) members do not live on the 
ranch. Certainly this figure fluctuates as men lose their jobs elsewhere 
and return to the ranch, or whatever. Still, at least 50% of the total 
non-resident members have never lived on the ranch for several years. In 
effect then, the il-ukumai resident on the ranch only number 24 which 
is clearly not a majority of the total ranch resident .membership. 
A second reason why the il-ukumai clan lack influence has to 
do with the fact that Maasai loyalties and interests are reflected in the 
age-grade system which distributes and often fragments clan loyalties 
and interests. For example, the ruling elder age-set on the ranch, the 
Nyangusi, are the real power brokers on the ranch committee and decisions 
concerning generational relationships, education, etc. are made at this 
level. Of course, all the Nyangusi on the ranch have input into the decision-
making until a consensus of opinion is reached. However, because the 
il-ukumai clan does not .monopolise this age-set (nor does any other clan), 
it happens that decisions have no basis in clanship. Fig.6 below shows 
the ranch membership according to age-set affiliation. 
-Set No. of Members 
Tareto 3 
Terito7 5 
Nyangusi 21 
Terekeiyia 19 
Rampau 17 
Tobola 1 
Fig. 5 
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A third factor which undermines decision-making on the ranch 
is that ranch loyalties arc often ignored, or overl ooked, because 01 
members' economic interest elsewhere. For example, some of the members, 
including the non-resident ranch committee chairman, are .more committed 
to developing their land holdings elsewhere. Other .members have membership 
on other group ranches and this is most definitely thought to contribute 
to their lack of interest in seeing Rotian Olmakongo. Fig 7 and 8 below 
show the land interests of x-anch .members elsewhere according to clan 
and age-set affiliations. 
Land Holdings Elsewhere: 
Age-Set 
Terito 
Nyangusi 
Terekeiyia 
Rampau (leasee) 
Kikuyu 
Kipsigis 
Total 
Ranch Membership Elsewhere: 
Age-Set 
Terito 
Nyangus i 
Terekeiyia 
Total 
Ho. Clan 
il-ukuma i 
il-aiser 
il-tarosero 
1 
1 
10 
Fig. 7 
Ho. 
1 
3 
"i 
Clan 
il-ukumai 
il-makesen 
il-molelian 
5 
Fig. 8 
Ho. 
4 
2 
1 
No, 
3 
1 
1 
Another reason given for the lack of development at Rotian 
Olmakongo is that non-Maasai members have no interest in sharing the 
costs of cattle,dips, firebreaks, etc. There are 10 Kikuyu and 4 Kipsigis 
members on the ranch, all of whom use the surname Ole Masikonde, who account 
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±'or 17% of the ranch .membership. With one exception, none of these 
non-Maasai own cattle and are solely concerned with agriculture. To be 
fair, however, it is important to note why these particular .members do 
not own cattle. All of the non-Maasai were originally brought to the 
area to herd cattle for the Masikonde family. Their importance as herders 
shrunk as herds diminished. Furthermore, any Kikuyu found herding cattle 
in the bush during the Emergency was regarded as a thief by the Maasai, 
thus making it impossible for acceptees to continue in this role. To 
this day, Kikuyu and. Kipsigis acceptees refuse to herd since they believe 
Maasai warriors will steal their cattle. Still, .many of these acceptees 
do keep sheep and goats but, these are cai-ed for by Maasai herders and 
are housed in Maasai kraals at night. In essence then, acceptees keep 
comparatively few animals and, in fact, there is little real opportunity 
for such people to fully participate in the pastoral economy, 
Maasai and non-Maasai ranch members live separate and apart 
on the ranch, the Maasai in 1ink-ang'itie' (homesteads) and non-Maasai 
in individual homes. Nevertheless, relations between the two groups are 
cordial.1 Of all the resident, married Maasai, 1Q% have Kikuyu or 
Kipsigis wives. This figure is almost equivalent to the number o.f non-
Maasai members (l7^). Maasai .men married to non-Maasai women are 
represented by 2 Nyangusi, 3 Terekeiyia, and 1 Rampau. Three of these 
men belong to the il-ukumai clan and 3 are il-makesen. None of these 
particular Maasai members owns more than 10 cattle, so they have little 
\rested interest in the pastoral economy. 
4. Relations between the two groups are sometimes strained when 
Maasai are fined allowing their cattle to enter shambas. 
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A close examination of the pastoral sector of the Rotian 
Olmakongo economy reveals some significant statistics regarding residence 
status and stockwealth, especially in relation to age-set affiliation 
(see Pig.9 below). 
Age-Set Resident Hon -Resident 30+Cattle No Cattle 
Tareto 3 - 1 2 
Terito 3 2 2 -
Nyangusi 16 5 6 2 
Terekeiyia 10 9 4 8 
Rampau 12 5 4 7 
Tabola 1 - - -
Kikuyu 7 3 1 9 
Kipsigis 4 - - 4. 
Total 56 24 18 32 
Pig. 9 
On the basis of the data presented above, it can be seen 
57% of the ranch members have no cattle. Considering the resident 
membership only, it should be noted that 13 of these .men (32%) do not own 
cattle. This includes 10 non-Haasai. On the other hand, 32% of the 
resident members own more than thirty cattle. The rest of the Maasai 
ranch members own herds whose volume falls between these two extremes. 
looking at the non-resident members, 14 of these men (58%) 
have no cattle. What is equally interesting about these .members is that 
21% of them (5) belong to the Nyangusi age-set and 38% (9) are Terekeiyia. 
None of these non-resident Nyangusi lack cattle, while all but one of the 
non-resident Terekeiyia have no cattle at all. This last comparison seems 
5. A herd size of 30+ cattle is used as a benchmark because Maasai 
informants regard this as significant in deciding if a herder is "committed" 
to the pastoral economy. 
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to support the contention made by numerous Hyangusi elders that "Terekeiyia 
have drunk their herds" and often occupy themselves by being vagrants. 
On the basis of the preceding comments on the distribution 
of stock wealth among ranch members, it should not be surprising that 
there is considerable conflict regarding what direction ranch development 
should take. The two development alternatives, aside from doing 
absolutely nothing, are to increase agriculture (i.e.,wh6et cropping) or 
improve the pastoral infrastructure. One faction of the membership, viz., 
wealthy stock owners, argue that agriculture has not benefited the 
ranch and should be discontinued. The others, who have little vested 
interest in pastoralism and nothing to gain from infrastructural improvement 
in this sector, want more ranch land given over to wheat cropping is 
order to increase revenue for individual members. 
With regards to membership support for these alternatives, it 
is worth .mentioning that 9 of the 18 resident .members with 30+ cattle 
are il-ukumai. Consequently, it is in the interest of these men to 
economically allign themselves with .men from other clans who also have 
large herds. However, as Pig.9 shows, men with more than 30 cattle belong 
to five different age-sets (plus one Kikuyu who does not have age-set 
membership). Because of this, these men have difficulty forming a united 
coalition with respect to ranch development. In fact, among the committed 
pastoralists on the ranch, objections to wheat cropping tend to develop 
out of individual interests, or appeals. Furthermore, this individualism 
appears to be responsible for the failure of ranch members to take any 
initiative in securing loans for pastoral development. The following 
example should serve to illustrate this point. 
During an informal meeting of the elders recently held at Rotian. 
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Olmakongo, the possibility of taking a development loan was discussed 
at great length. Finally, it was unanimously agreed that the ranch 
should not take out a loan. As one Terekeiyia elder reasoned, "loans 
will only make our people quarrel". One answer for this refusal of a 
development loan could very well stem from the fact htat, even though some 
members are united in their desire for further pastoral development, there 
is no traditional sociological unit present in which their solidarity 
can be channelled. As I have pointed out earlier in this paper, solidarity 
in one sphere of activities (i.e., ranch development) may be overshadowed 
by solidarity deriving from other spheres of activity (e.g., age-set, 
clan, lineage, or family relations). Indeed, in order to avoid upsetting 
these other activities, the Nyangusi elders, or il-ukumai chansmen, at 
Rotian Olmakongo give the impression that they would prefer to do nothing. 
Exploring this individualistic tract still further, .many of the 
ranch members-complain vehemently about the lack of ranch development 
and the difficulty of reaching consensus opinions, although some semblance 
of consensus does exist in their anti-development posturing. In any event, 
it is safe to say that the major constraint on ranch development at 
Rotian Olmakongo does not derive from a lack of incentive, or acute 
laziness (as the members are often accused of). Instead, I would prefer 
to think it derives from the inability of ranch members to realize new 
organizational forms to handle the interests of people, not just age-mates 
ox- clansmen. Here, I concur with Schneider (19.74) that the social risks, 
or" opportunity costs" involved are simply too high. 
Early this March, Rotian Olmakongo held its Annual General 
x^ anch meeting.^ At this meeting, local government officials suggested that 
6. Further to this, it is important to note that, since 30% of the 
.membership is non-resident and that a 60% turnout is needed for a quorum, 
a 90% turnout of resident members must be x-eached. This, rather than pure 
indifference, probably explains why meetings often must be cancelled due to 
poor attendance. 
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the ranch should take out a ,c'.: 30,000/ loan to contract for a bulldozer 
to clear more ranch land for wheat production. The reason being that 
profits from wheat could then be used for further ranch development 
The membership voted to take out the loan. ' How, this might seem to 
contradict what has already been said above concerning members' negative 
attitudes to development loans. However, it must be recognized here that 
the member's of Rotian Olmakongo are under much psychological pressure 
to demonstrate signs of 'progress' since nothing visible has been done at 
the ranch for .more than ten years. Furthermore, members are aware that th 
are considered one of the least cooperative group ranches in the district 
with an apathetic and reactive membership. Also, this loan did not seem 
excessive to the .members once they understood, that they would only have 
to repay the loan at the rate of S: 3,000/ per year, so they voted in the 
g 
affirmative to appease government. 
During this same meeting, elders continually justified the lack 
of ranch development by pointing to the ranch committee's lack of 
organizational ability. To offset this, local government officials 
suggested that the .membership elect a new committee of more competent 
people. Once again, however, the basic contradiction concerning members' 
interests arose. That is, the membership voted unanimously to retain the 
7. Many officials are only too aware of this contradiction. In 
fact, after a public vote, many ranch members go to their offices to 
complain that thoy'really did not intend to vote the way they did. 
8. Prom talking with ranch members, it seems clear that they do 
not understand the principles behind borrowing and repaying .money. 
Consequently, neither do they understand that they will have to repay 
much more than the original 30,000/ loan. 
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existing committee. In a very real sense then, it would seem that the 
committee's lack of initiative is somehow responsible for maintaining 
the delicate balance between conflicting interests on the ranch. Similarly, 
ranch elders were denying membership to the younger Rampau ago-set even 
though these young men had legitimate rights to membership according to 
the ranch constitution. Of course, the Rampau were registered at this 
meeting according to the terms of the group ranch constitution, .much to 
the displeasure of the elders who regard them as another potentially 
disruptive faction in an already precarious decisions-making forum. 
Because of the difficulties surrounding cooperation and unity 
on the ranch, the potential for subdivision of the ranch land into 
individual, or family, holdings is also a major concern for many members 
Already, members with land holdings elsewhere and those without cattle, 
together with the accepteoa, regard subdivision favourably. In fact, if 
these three groups were to join foi"ces and vote in favour of subdivision 
they would undoubtedly succeed since they constitute 76$ of the total 
ranch .membership. Ranch planning officials have told the members that, 
if everybody is in favour of subdivision, then the ranch can be demarcated 
into individual holdings. However, the membership has not yet moved in 
this direction for the same reasons that decisions concerning ranch 
development have not been taken. Namely, that economic interests are 
often over-shadowed by obligations to clans, age-sets, lineages, and so 
on. Furthermore, non-resident members often fail to appear at ranch meetings 
to exercise their vote; some members in favour of sub-division are compromised 
by their allegiance to committed pastoralj.sts; while others refuse to 
consider subdivision because they intend to participate in the pastoral 
economy later on. 
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Maasai ranch members who are committed to a pastoral economy 
insist that the amount of land an individual or family v/ould have after 
sub-division would not be sufficient to support a large cattle herd. 
Moreover, they worry that sub-division will result in their children 
being disenfranchised from the land. Thus, it appears that Rotian $ 
Olmalcongo is in something of a stalemate position where members are reluctant 
to make decisions for fear that this could upset the delicately balanced 
s ta tus quo. 
The Cattle Economy of Rotian Olmakongo 
It should be clearly understood that .most Maasai living at 
Rotian Olmakongo are ideologically committed to pastoral ism and that they 
regard this as the most prestigious economic endeavour possible. As 
previously noted, 32% of these Maasai members keep herds of indigenous 
Zebu cattle numbering 30+; 12% have no cattle; and, the remainder fall 
somewhere in between these two extremes. Sheep and goats are also kept 
on the ranch. However, sheep are never .milked and goats are only milked 
if the kid dies and the milk is used solely for .making tea. Sheep and 
goats are mainly utilized for ritual purposes, as a medium of social 
exchange, as slaughter stock during food shortages, and as market stock 
when cash is scarce. Blood is rarely consumed by ranch members or their 
families. 
A survey of seven boma sites on the ranch (see Pig. 10 over-
leaf) shows that most Maasai herders cannot fulfill their subsistence 
needs from their cattle alone since milk production is insufficient. 
Instead, their diet is supplemented almost daily by maize meal, home-grown 
vegetables, fat, sugar and tea. Of course, use of these products declines 
slightly during the wet season. 
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Boma 
Site 
No. of 
Cattle 
No. of 
tating 
Lac-1 Milk Prod/"' 
Cows Rainy Sea 
(litres) 
Caloric 
Content 
Milk Prod. 
Dry Seas 
(litres 
3 
Caloric 
Content 
1 180 54 81 54270 27 18090 
2 120 36 54 36180 18 12060 
3 164 49 74 49448 25 16482 
4 220 66 99 66330 33 22110 
5 67 20 30 20200 10 6733 
6 98 29 44 29547 15 9849 
l" 395 118 179 119092 59 39697 
Bo.ma 
Site 
Residents 
Men Women Child 
4 
Caloric Requirements 
Men Women Children 
Total 
1 10 7 22 28000 16800 40000 84800 
2 6 7 17 16800 16800 34000 67600 
3 4 3 11 11200 7200 22000 40400 
4 10 10 16 28000 24000 32000 84000 
5 8 7 16 22400 16800 32000 71200 
6 5 4 12 14000 9600 24000 47600 
7 4 4 8 11200 9600 16000 36800 
1. 
Pig.10 
In order to estimate how many lactating cows were in each herd, 
I first assumed that approximately 60% of the total herd would 
be heifers or adult cows (e.f., Jacobs 1965) and that 50% of these 
would be lactating at any one time, although this is too high as 
the actual percentage would be lower. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Based on informants estimates and other sources (eg., Jacobs 1965, 
Dahi and Hjort 197?) I assume that Maasai cows on average will 
produce 1.5 litres of milk for human consumption in the wet season 
and .5 litres during the dry season. 
Based on an estimate of 670 calories per litre of Maasai milk. 
Based on the following: Adult Male (over 18 years) needs 2800 
calories per day. Adult Pe.male (over 18 years) need 2400 calories 
per day. A child needs 2000 calories per day. This may be an 
over-estimation for the Maasai. 
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This insufficient .milk production for subsistence needs can 
be further elaborated on by focusing on one boma site at Rotian Olmakongo 
(i.e., boma site no. 1, Fig.10). There are 180 cattle belonging to 
this boma v/hich are intended to support an extended family of 10 adult 
.males, 7 adult females, and 20 children. The daily caloric requirement 
for these people is 84,800 calories. By estimating the number of lactat.ing 
cows and the volume of .milk they could produce the wet and dry seasons, it 
is reasonable to say that this extended family has access to 54,270 
calories during the wet season and 18,090 calories during the dry season. 
Consequently, it should be obvious that these people cannot subsist purely 
on a milk diet and that they, and others like them, must use alternative 
food sources. 
The effects of generally small herd size and the inability of 
herds to provide subsistence has several social and economic ramifications. 
Many families are forced to slaughter stock for their own consumption or 
sell animals to buy grain. Families with less than 100 cattle were found 
to have a stock off-take of up to 30%, only 3 to 5% of which is accounted 
for by consumption, rituals, etc. There is a slightly higher off-take of 
sheep and goats. Some of this off-take is in the form of exchange with 
stock traders. For example, 2 heifers might be exchanged for 24 sheep 
or one oxen for 2 heifers. Steers are regularly exchanged for heifers. 
As can be seen, this does not represent an absolute off-take since one 
type of animal is replaced with another. About half of this off-take 
does consist of cash sales of old, barren, diseased and dying cattle. 
Over-all off-take is too high to permit natural herd growth. 
However, since most of these Maasai are involved in other economic 
activities v/hich bring in cash at various times of the year, they will 
attempt to replace this off-take by purchase of heifers from Mulot or 
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trekkers. As a consequence, many households maintain herds with up to 
80% female stock. The poorer the stock-owner and the smaller the herd, 
the higher the preponderance of female cattle. Herd structure can be 
directly related to this high off-take and subsequent purchase of heifers. 
In other words, herd composition and growth is not dependent on natural 
fertility. 
To a large extent, alternative economic activities subsidize 
the pastoral economy at Rotian Olmakongo. The sale of cattle and dietary 
changes should not be interpreted as a sign of .modernity. To the contrary, 
they are the result of increasing scarcity and they clearly replace a 
high protein diet with a less nutritious cereal grain diet. 
Another consequence of small herds is that they influence 
participation in the age-grade system. Elders on the ranch have persuaded 
.most warrious (ie., Rampau and Tobola) to by-pass their period of residency 
at the warrior manyatta. This is not a result of a need for additional 
labour power since older boys and children do .most of the herding. I 
would argue that these warriors are discouraged from fully entering 
moranhood because their families cannot afford to allow any of their .milch 
cattle to be taken away to the .manyatta. As a result, the senior warriors 
here have quickly performed their .milk drinking ceremony, entering 
elderhood. 
I would also suggest that the low rate of polygamy among the 
Maasai on the ranch can be correlated with small herd sizes and the 
inability to support .multiple families. 88% of Maasai marriages on the 
ranch are monogamous, although the potential for polygamy exists. Although 
I have not collected demographic data, I would suggest that this low 
polygamy rate is giving rise to a more equitable proportion of marriageable 
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.men and women especially since warriorhood has been reduced 
to only a few years. Another phenomenon which occurs frequently in this 
g 
area is sister exchange without any cattle exchanging hands. Since 
informants state that sucii .mo-ppicigG s are definitely on the increase it 
would seem that small herd size and the inability to pay bridewealth might 
well be the reason for this. 
Small herd sizes, together with insecurities of group ownership 
of land has also effected relationships between stock friends. Hot 
only do small herds limit a man who wishes to build up a diffuse network 
of stock associates, but ranch members discourage one another from 
accepting cattle from their stock friends. Although there are a number 
of complex reasons for this, the overwheling explanation seems to be the 
suspiscion that accepting cattle from stock friends is the first step 
whereby they will try to move onto the ranch. The Rotian area is 
certainly beginning to show signs of overgrazing and ranch members will 
correctly point out that this is because of the numerous illegal graziers. 
In fact, in terms of meeting the subsistence needs of ranch members alone, 
the ranch is understocked. 
Returning to the change in dietary practices on the ranch I 
should elaborate further. Examing boma site 1, shows that their combined 
herds as seen in fig.10, can supply 82% of their subsistence requirements 
in the wet season and 21% in the dry season. On the average then, the 
family herd from this boma provides only 51% of the diet. This is in 
.marked contrast to Jacob's (1965:155) finding that in the 1960's, 
agricultural products formed less than 20^ of the Maasai yearly diet. 
Although the contribution of herds to subsistence varies from bo.ma to bo.ma 
and family to family, the .majority of Maasai on the ranch are in a position 
similar to bo.ma site 1 and must supplement their diet with cereal, etc. 
9. Informants state that marriages based on sister exchange are usually 
very unstable and divorce very common. These .marriages are arranged because 
the men involved are unable to pay cattle for bride price. 
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Now, given this reduction in dependence on a milk diet, in 
many cases to almost 50% of the total calorie intake, it is interesting 
to note that Pratt and Gwynne (l977'39) speculate that "if half the 
milk ration is replaced by grain, then half the number of breeding 
females are required and the land requirement per family is halved". 
Indeed, this very process is occuring at Rotian Olmakongo due to expanding 
human populations, agricultural encroachment, declining cattle numbers 
and so on. On the other hand, the ecologists' prediction (ibid:39) 
"Reduce the dependence on the milk diet and the battle is at least part-
won", does not appear to be materializing. Again I would stress that 
declining milk dependency is the result of scarcity and poverty and the 
'battle' that many stockowners are fighting is a losing one. Rotian 
Olmakongo .members have reached a point in time where they must be encouraged 
to develop a ranching infrastructure or it will soon be too late. Ranch 
development could perhaps be founded on the sale of immatures for 
fattening as this would be consistent with the generally high percentage 
of female stock. Stock trekkers on the ranch might be in favour of a 
steer fattening operation. If development of the rnach does not occur, 
then it is not difficult to predict total impoverishment for many -Maasai 
families and eventual disenfranchise.ment from the land. 
Even given the generally small herd sizes, ranch development is 
inhibited to some extent by the disparities in stock wealth that do exist. 
Since repayment of a development loan is based on the proportion of stock 
wealth that each .member possess, those few men with very large herds feel 
that they will have to bear the greatest burden for development. Indeed, 
there are several families that are too poor in stock wealth to contribute 
financially. Moreover, as I earlier pointed out, there ai-e no traditional 
social units on which to base solidarity in terms of livestock development. 
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In sum then, the prospects for development on Rotian Olmakongo 
must be seen in relation to the benefits that individual members perceive 
accruing to them and the social and economic costs of those benefits. It 
is important to remember that economic development will sometimes have 
different ramifications for the individual than for the group. Por- this 
reason group endeavours are most often a compromise solution that is 
acceptable to the ma jority oi members. The problem here is that the 
compromise solution at Rotian Olmakongo, i.e., doing nothing, provides 
no incentive for development. At present, because of necessity and herd 
management practices, men on the ranch provide a labour reserve which is 
findings an outlet in other economic activities which largely support the 
livestock economy. Offering other compromise solutions to Rotian Olmakongo 
members will sonn be essential if the ranch is to survive. As a start, 
I would suggest that organized and full exploitation of many of the 
economic alternatives already in operation could provide the incentive 
and capital for ranch development. 
Economic Alternatives and Land Use Patterns 
Charcoal Burning 
Charcoal burning for commercial sales began in the Rotian 
area in the 1960's and was usually carried on by non-Maasai acceptees. 
However, after adjudication .many Rotian Olmakongo .members began to 
complain that individuals were making a profit from what was supposed to 
be a group land. Some people even pointed to this as a reason for sub-
division, arguing that everyone was not benefiting equally from group 
resources and that if land was sub-divided then each owner of the land 
could charge others to .make use of their resources. Some ranch members 
argued that resources on the ranch are free to be used by any member. The 
compromise solution to this was that more Maasai should start to burn 
charcoal and/or any member who did not could hire Kikuyu labourers to work 
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for them. By 1974, the practice of hiring labourers to burn charcoal 
for Maasai employees became widespread. 
A large portion of the forests on Rotian Oltnakongo are given 
over to charcoal .making. A general survey of the ranch shows that 74'/ 
of the resident ranch .members either burn charcoal themselves or hire one 
or more labourers to burn for them. Without any doubt, ranch members 
would admit that charcoal burning is the largest source of revenue on 
the ranch, providing a steady though small flow of cash. The only indi-
viduals not involved in this business are a few very old .men, and a few 
wealthy herders and cattle trekkers. 
Informants state that a hardworking labourer with capital to 
employ help can produce 140 bags of charcoal in one week which is a lorry 
load, although this is rare. Most labourers average approximately 15 to 
20 bags per week. Since .most Maasai do not work full time at charcoal 
burning, it is estimated that a Maasai can average 4 to 8 bags per week, 
labourers use power saws to fell the wood and then hire helpers to arrange 
it into several kilns which burn for 5 days. Charcoal burners are paid 
12 shillings per bag and labourers must give their Maasai employers 4 
shillings on evey bag. A 7 ton lorry arrives on the ranch every day and 
loads up with 140 bags. On average, a labourer can bring in 240 shillings 
per week of which 80 shillings are paid to an individual Maasai employer. 
In this way, the ranch has effectively individualized a group 
resource and all profits from this industry are highly distributed. There 
is no opportunity to pool charcoal money for ranch developments such as 
financing dip construction. Members are afraid that if charcoal .money 
was pooled in the name of the ranch that only a few people would benefit, 
so it is better that each individual makes his own money. Furthermore, 
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if it were not for charcoal burning many Maasai on the ranch would have 
no other source of income. Since much of this money is used for the 
purchase of cattle as well as food, clothing, etc., it is one of the 
few alternatives open that allow many Maasai to plug into the cash economy. 
Piotian Olnakongo is covered with 988 hectares of open or dense 
forest and this constitutes 59$ of their total land. The charcoal 
industry utilizes a limited variety of tx-ees and shrubs. 
1) ' 01-leleshwa (Maasai name), tarchonanthus camphoratus (botanical 
name Dale and Greenway 1961 160).This is a bushy shrub, the 
leaves smelling of camphor when crushed. 
2) 01-k.inyei (Maasai name) Euclea schimperi (ibid. 177). This 
is a small tree, abundant in this area, 
3) 01~orlen (Maasai name) Olea africana (ibid. 348). This is a 
heavily branched spreading tree commonly known as a brown or 
wild olive tree. It grows to a height of 20 to 30 feet. 01-orien 
is also used fox- firewood. 
4) 01-paligilagi (Maasai name) Tricholadus ellipticus (ibid. 233). 
This is shrub or a thicket forming tree which attains a height 
of 35feet. Traditionally, since it is a hard tough wood which 
bends easily, it was used as poles in hut construction - though 
ranch members no longer build traditional huts. 
5) 01-tepesi (Maasai name): 
Although charcoal burning is not completely unselective, it 
nevertheless constitutes a major source of ecological deprivation since 
there is 110 thought of reforestation for conservational purposes and 
indiscriminate cutting denudes the ai-ea of trees that provide shade and 
and soil protection. A recent newspaper release suggested that all 
forests in Narok District should be gazetted in ordex- to protect them 
from the devastation of charcoal burning. Now the Maasai have always 
been highly suspiscious of such policies as witnessed by their x-eaction 
in 1948 to the gazetting of part of the Mau forest. 
The complete cessation of charcoal burning on Eotian Olmakongo 
would have dx-astic social conseqxiences since so .many Maasai are dependent 
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on this industry to subsidize the livestock economy. Not only would it 
be difficult to stop charcoal burning given the overwhelming policing 
this would involve, but also one must remember that 80% of the energy 
used in Kenya is derived from wood and such a policy would send prices 
soaring. At present, members agree that the forest on the ranch will 
be 'finished' in five years, yet they do not slow down burning because 
they need the cash so much. There is no reason why management plans on 
Rotian Olmakongo should not include all possible types of production 
I would suggest that the charcoal industry on the ranch be organized so 
that control and management of resources is possible and so that some 
capital is generated for future investment in the ranch. Such managed 
charcoal burning operations wotild also be a valuable means for clearing the 
bush to the desired density and species. 
Control of charcoal burning might be easier if ranch members 
had some added incentive for such control. Perhaps one way of promoting 
this would be for the ranch to take out a loan to buy a lorry. Rather 
than selling their charcoal for 12 shillings a bag they could transport 
it to market centres to obtain 20+shillings per bag. Individual ranch 
members could continue to burn or hire labourers, who would still receive 
12 shillings a bag. All profits gained on the sale to external markets 
would be put into a Group Savings Account that would initially be used 
to repay the loan and maintain the vehicle. 
A lorry -could- serve as a multipurpose vehiclecarrying logs 
from the ranch's timber business, transporting cattle and picking up 
supplies for local dukas on return trips. It is estimated that a lorry 
could probably earn 4000 profit per week. The cost of petrol, salary 
for a driver and turnboy (who could be hired from the ranch) would be 
deducted from this profit. The already existing revenue accruing to 
individuals would not be upset while the lorry would generate additional 
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profits for the group. Repayment of the loan would not come out of 
individual contributions. When the lorry was paid off after a few 
years, then profits could be used for ranch developments such as a dip, 
breeding stock, etc. Should the venture fail the lorry could be sold 
to repay the debt and this would not affect individuals in the same way 
as repayment of a loan to contract for a bulldozer. 
A loan for a lorry should be accompanied by instruction in 
management and. organization for controlled bush clearance and/or 
reforestation. It is hoped that the additional group revenue will help 
provide this incentive. Managment of such a business endeavour is not 
impossible for Rotian Olmakongo .members to run. One' has only to observe 
the accomplishments at 11 ICerin Project where patience and adult education 
have enable illiterate Maasai to operate small dairy businesses, keeping 
records, etc. At Rotian Olmakongo, the group ranch committee could act 
as custodians of the group savings account with numerous checks and 
balances, such as an A.P.O. Loans Officer countersigning cheques after 
receiving invoices, etc. The advantage of such a lorry operation is that 
is would x^ roduce immediate short-term benefits for the ranch members 
which are consistent with their existing economic patterns. 
Timbei" Cutting 
Another smaller industry on the ranch is the timber cutting 
business. There is only one species of tree used for this purpose and 
that is ol-tarakwai (Maasai name) or junipercus procera) (ibid.: 
3). Ol-tarakwai is also called 'pencil cedar' and is the largest juniper 
in the world. It is of major economic importance for the timber industry 
in East Afi-ica. The wood is of a light to medium weight and straight 
grained with an excellent natural durability. It is sometimes exported 
to Europe where it is used for lead pencils, wardrobe linings, etc. In 
Kenya, it is used for building, construction, flooring, roof-shingles 
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fence posts, telegraph poles, etc. The Maasai on Rotian Olmakongo no 
longer build traditional huts but rather ol-tarakwaj. in the construction 
of 'improved' houses with thatched roofs. 
The group committee on the ranch tightly controls participation 
in this industry. Only ranch members with extraordinary needs for cash 
are given permission to cut timber. Por example, one member was allowed 
to cut five lorry loads of lumber in order to pay for his wife's medical 
expenses. Presently there are three members with permission to cut timber 
and they have been registered at the Range Office in Narok in order to 
prevent anyone else from trying to enter the business. The reason given 
by committee members for such stringent control is that if everyong cut 
timber there would soon be none left for the local people for hut 
construction. In effect, the timber industry can be understood as a form 
of insurance that provides cash when a member has legitimate and urgent 
need of money. 
The three ranch members who are now allowed in the business 
all hire several Kikuyu labourers who live in the area expressly for this 
purpose. The Kikuyu all own their own power saws and they charge 40 
shillings per litre of petrol and one shilling per log. Six workers are 
then employed to load the logs onto the lorry and they are paid 10 
shillings each. After the timber has been felled the Maasai employer has 
two options open to him. He can sell the timber locally, in which case 
he is paid 300 shillings for a lorry load of 40 logs and the contractor 
also pays for the labourers and loaders. On the other hand, he can hire 
a lorry and driver to haul the timber to Nairobi where it sells for 2,300 
to 2800 shillings depending on the quality. However since lori-y rental 
is at least 1,400 shillings and the employer must pay his labourers and 
travel to Nairobi with the timber to be paid, the first option is most 
often chosen at a substantial reduction in potential profits for the Maasai 
employer. 
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Once again, the ownership of a lorry by the ranch would cut 
out the 1,400 shilling rental fee and this would make the sale of timber 
in Nairobi a more attractive proposition. Moreover, ol-orien trees are 
also an excellent wood for furniture and pannelling (Dale and G-reenway 
1961:348) and ax^ e abundant on the ranch. These trees .might also be 
exploited in the timber business depending on their mai-ketability. A 
certain percentage of the increased profits or a few lox-ry loads per 
month could be channelled into the group bank account for repayment of 
the loxrry loan and eventually fox- development on the ranch. 
Cattle Trekking 
Another activity which generates income for several ranch members 
is cattle trekking. There are several full ox- part-time trekkers as well 
as numerous resident non-members who are trekkers. Most of the cattle 
trekkers are from the Rampau age-set although there are a few Terekeiyia 
who are stock traders. Cattle trekking is a shox't-term business since it 
requires considerable stamina and men generally do not trek for more than 
six yeax-s. Nevertheless, it is a highly lucrative business and the 
quickest way for- a young man to finance a hex"d in anticipation of marriage. 
A full-time cattle trelcker estimates that he can earn 15,000 shillings in 
a year. 
The details of cattle trekking demand a paper in themselves. 
Suffice it to say, cattle trekkers travel to Mulot where they buy Kipsigis 
and Kisii stock, usually bulls, which they trek to Ngong and sell to local 
slaughter houses for a considerable profit.10 Trekkers also buy and 
10. Trekkers prefer to sell their animals to local butchers rather 
than to K.M.C. because butchers return the hide and stomach. The hide 
can be sold and the stomach contents (fat) can be sold also or taken home, 
Boma sites with a couple of resident cattle trekkers claim that they 
nevex" have to buy fat as trekkers provide them with a sufficient supply. 
- 33 - IDS/WP 356. 
exchange animals with other Maasai along the way. Most of the profits 
from this business go into buying heifers for a man's own herd, although 
some is channelled into conspicuous consumption such as a watch. One 
young Rampau cattle treklcer on the ranch has been so successful that he 
has already married three wives, built up a large herd and is now building 
a duka on the ranch in order to set up a small trading business. Everyone 
agrees that this was made possible because of his accomplishments as a 
cattle trckker. 
I would suggest that cattle trekkers could also benefit from 
the group ownership of a lorry. During slack periods the lorry could be 
rented to them to transport stock from Mulot to Ugong. The time 
advantage that this would give them and the ability to make several trips 
in a short period would more than pay for the lorry rental. One .might 
hope that the added time would encourage trekkers not to by-pass 
quarantine, although this is doubtfull. Still, such a way of transporting 
stock may aid in disease control in a small way since sick animals would 
not be trekking throughout the district. The use of transport for cattle 
trading is not unknown and several wealthy cattle trekkers (some from 
outside Maasailand) have already inrested in a lorry. 
Two cattle trekkers on the ranch have applied for an A.P.O. 
loan in order to buy cattle in large quantities. Trekkers maintain that 
it is not economical to make the trip to Ngong with less than ten cattle. 
With a loan, trekkers could buy .more animals at one time and make fewer 
trips with larger profits. Financing of this type as v/ell as the use of 
a lorry would greatly facilitate the transport of slaughter stock to 
market centres. Cattle trekkers on Rotian Olmakongo could also be 
encouraged to start a steer fattening operation with the group ranch 
getting a certain percentage of the profit as a grazing fee.. 
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Wheat Growing 
Rotian Olmakongo has been leasing land for wheat for several 
years. However, due to the inability of the .members to decide how to 
divide profits, it was agreed in 1977 that the wheat land on the ranch 
would be divided into six 'wheat shambas' of approximately 100 acres each 
and with 11 members sharing profits in each group. Any 11 members could 
form into a group on the basis of family ties, friendship or the ability 
to cooperate with one another. Each group decides separately who they 
will lease their land to on the basis of a three year contract. The 
leasee pays 150 shillings per acre per year. One third is paid to the 
group before planting and two thirds are paid after the harvest. 
This system is less than perfect and some groups have found 
that after harvest their leasee has fled without paying any money. This 
tends to happen especially during bad years such as 1977 when the wheat 
crop rotted in the field due to excessive rains. Most groups have never 
received .more than 300 shillings per person per year and usually less. 
This is an insignificant amount compared to what the leasee makes when 
ho sells his crop. Because of this, some members feel that the ranch 
should stop leasing land for wheat,while other members want more acreage 
put under wheat so that individual profits will be higher. 
When asked what the advantages and disadvantages of wheat 
growing are, besides money, members replied as follows. The only advantage 
cited was that after harvest cattle can graze on the stubble. The 
stubble is rough and course but yields adequate fodder provided that 
cattle are watered on the same day. However, if cattle are not watered 
they become thirsty and their milk production falls. Since Maasai cattle 
are not watered every day, believing that this would make'their joints 
weak, cattle cannot be gx^ azed on wheat stubble daily.1" 
11, Maasai claim that they cannot graze on the wheat stubble in upper 
Mau because there are no dips and their cattle dies 
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A disadvantage of wheat growing is that wheat is planted in 
prime graze land which could be utilized by cattle. Another disadvantage 
is that leasees can fine Maasai stockowners for cattle tresspass into 
wheat shambas. Maasai also claim that wheat shambas attract buffalos 
close to their homes. 
During this 1979 planting season only three of the groups on 
Rotian Olamkongo were able to find "leasees for their land. This is 
blamed on the fact that the Wheat Board has been forced to cut back on 
loans because of bankruptcy. Thus, regardless of the wishes of ranch 
members, factors beyond their control continue to make the profitability 
of wheat growing highly unstable. Despite this ranch members did vote to 
accept a loan to contract for a bulldozer to clear more land for wheat 
•in 1980! 
Because profits from wheat growing accrue to individuals ra.ther 
than the group ranch, wheat has not benefited ranch development. Ranch 
member's refuse to make contributions for such development out of their 
own packets as the little cash that they do get from wheat is quickly 
spent. This is not to say that wheat growing is necessarilly in 
opposition to ranch development, provided that the carrying capacity 
of the remainder of the ranch is sufficient to support the livestock 
population. Ranch members have been unwilling to take out Wheat Board 
loans because of the risk involved. If registered members find the crop 
ruined, unlike the leasees, they cannot run away. In many ways this 
should make than more attractive as loan recipients. Perhaps if group 
ranches were offered guaranteed minimum return loans then Maasai would 
be willing to plant their own wheat and thus realize the true profits to 
be made. The ranch could designate some acx-eage to be £>lanted j_n n a m e 
of the ranch and profits could be put in the group bank account for 
development purposes. 
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Over and above the attitudes of ranch members towards wfeat 
growing, there are numerous factors which play a role in declining 
wheat production. Fragmentation of holdings, inefficient contractors, 
Wheat Board bankruptcy, and above all else, a terribly inadequate 
transportation system.. These are all realities which must be solved 
at the national level before Maasai can be expected to realize the benefits 
of wheat growing. 
Shambas. 
Keeping a sharaba not only supplements the pastoral diet for 
.many Maasai but in some cases, especially for Kikuyu families, it also 
provides a small cash income. At present there are 20+ .member families 
who maintain individual shambas. These shambas, which are never more 
than a couple of acres, ai-e planted close to the owners borne. A member 
does not have to ask permission from anyone to plant a shamba. On the 
other hand, it is agreed that shambas cannot be too large. It is difficult 
to determine exactly what Maasai mean by 'too large', but I was told that 
this would be a shamba that was planted for commercial purposes only. Most 
shambas are tended by women and gcareO towards domestic consumption. 
The crops planted include maize, beans and potatoes. Some families do 
sell their surplus produce in Narok or to other ranch members, Maasai 
women claim that it is only in the last five years that shamba keeping 
among Maasai women became so widespread. 
The ownership of a shamba does not in any way imply that an 
individual owns that tract of land. Once a man ox1 woman clears a plot, 
they have undisputable x-ights of unsufruct. However1, if a shamba is 
abandoned then anyone is free to take it over. Sharaba owners can prevent 
tresspass into their shambas when it is in use and can fine other members 
if their cattle trample crops. These individual rights are not seen 
as contx-adicting principles of group ownex-ship-. 
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Other Sources of Income 
Employment off the ranch is becoming an increasingly important 
alternative economic strategy. 3?or example, five ranch members are 
employed as night watchmen, three work at tourist lodges in the area, 
two are hired herders, one builds houses and one is a turnboy. Because 
of the low standard of education - only one member has gone to secondary 
school - the jobs available to most ranch members are extremely low 
paying, most .men earning under 300 shillings per month. The ideal is 
to send some money home each month and save some for buying cattle, 
however, savings are usually too small for building up a herd. Even so, 
i 
many young men on the ranch have been searching for jobs, and have been 
unable to find anything. This potential labour force will certainly 
continue to grow as more and more Maasai seek opportunities to supplement 
the pastoral economy with cash. 
As Campbell and Migot Adholla (1979.2) have recently suggested, 
there.-!is '.an urgent need to develop secondary and tertiary activities 
in order to generate employment and capital in Kajiando District of 
Maasailand. This is true of Ha role District as well. Increasing 
impoverishment and a growing number of underemployed men in the pastoral 
economy (an indication of rising rural-urban migration), should underscore 
the readiness of .many Maasai to participate in alternative forms of 
employment. The closer these occupations are to the pastoral economy, 
such as leather tanning, producing ghee, etc., the greater are the 
opportunities for stimulating growth in both the cash and subsistence 
economies. 
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Summary 
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate the ways in 
which an evaluation of ranch development or lack of development, must • 
take into account how decisions pertaining to development are related 
to a number of social and economic considerations. Many decision-making 
strategies, such as those that set individual and group interests in 
opposlijion in isvour oil q. co.uipx'o.io.iSG s olution often inhibit ranch 
development. The analysis was done from the micro-level, examining the 
ways in which ranch members perceive their interests to be best served 
given the options which they understand to be open to them. This approach 
has been purposefully different from macro-level analysis which attempt 
to show how Kenyan national policy and political organization contribute 
to the formulation of development strategies, (i.e., why group ranches in 
the first place) and how this affects the decisions made by administrators, 
planners, field officers, etc. 
I have attempted to demonstrate the types of constraints on 
economic development which are operational at the so-called 'grassroots' 
level. The lack of development on the ranch was related to the inability 
of traditional social units to generate organizational form for such 
development and in fact often led to serious problems of disunity on 
the ranch. 
The pastoral economy on the ranch is in a precarious position, 
to a large extent being subsidized: by charcoal burning or other economic 
activities, which have been organized to serve individual interests rather 
than group interests. Since many of these alternative economic 
activities are short-term, I have' suggested that they be organized, in 
such a way that they generate capital for the group ranch and that this 
capital be invested in the livestock'economy. The future of the area 
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depends on how cheaply and how much growth can be realized from trans-
forming a struggling subsistence pastoral economy into a more productive 
sector. If this is not encouraged immediately then the only future 
for the group ranch will be in terms of small-scale agricultural holdings. 
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